Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1952

State of Utah v. Budd Jay Read : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Clinton D. Vernon; Quention L. R. Alston; Richard J. Maughan; Attorneys for Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, State v. Read, No. 7792 (Utah Supreme Court, 1952).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1681

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

.

..

1

1

--------------------------------------

-------------------------------

In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent,

vs.

Case No. 883

BUDD JAY READ,
Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

'\;;··

~

"7 -- . '.

F 1 -~ . .~ t~J
\':. -.:\ ·-_.:

..: ·. ~2

:-,~·-;:;·\

jt)gLINTON D. VERNON,
Attorney General

- --- --·- ---- -- - ----- ---·- - -··---- - - --- --~----- · QUENTIN

L. R. ALSTON,
MAUGHAN,
Assistant Attorneys General

C...: ~·:~. . , ~:~; ) -; ·· t- rr!e Lu-::~~.. - ~~:,-::."~RICHARD

J.

Attorneys for Respondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX
Page
STATEMENT OF FACTS ------------------------------:---------------------

3

STATEMENT 0 F POINTS --------------------------------------------------

4

ARGUMENT -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4
Point I. The Evidence is Sufficient to Sustain the Conviction _______________________________________ ------__ ------______________ .__ __ ____ 4
Point II. The Court Properly Instructed the Jury______________ 10
Point III. The Court Properly Refused to Grant a New
Trial ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 13
CONCLUSION ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 14

AUTHORITIES CITED
26 American Jurisprudence, Homicide Sees. 507, 508 ________ 10

53 American Juris prudence, Trial, Sec. 529 -------------------------- 11
53 American Jurisprudence, Trial, Sec. 5~·9, 541 ------~----------- 13

Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice,
Permanent Ed. Sec. 6320 ---------------------------------------------- 12

CASES CITED
Alabama Power Co. v. Jackson, 232 Ala. 42, 166 So. 692.. 12
Alaga Coach Line v. McCarrol, 227 Ala. 686, 151 So. 834,
92 A.L.R. 470 ------------------------------------------------------------------ 12

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX Continued
Page
Albert v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 894, 27 S.E. 2d 177 -------- 8
Cain v. State, ____ Tex. Cr. R. ____ , 178 SW 2d 267 ---------------- 10
·Flowers v. State, ____ Tex. Cr. ____ , 177 SW 2d 67 ------------------ 10
Keller v. State, 155 Tenn. 633, 299 SW 803, 59 A.L.R. 685.. 9
Pack v. State, 54 Ok. Cr. 234; 18 P 2d 284 ---------------------------- 10
People v. Kelley, 70 Cal. App. 519, 234 P 110 ------------------ 8
Silsby v. Hinchey, 107 SW 2d 812 · ---------------------------------------- 12
State v. Johnson, ____ Mo. ____ , 55 SW 2d 967 ---------------------- 10
State v. Thatcher, 108 Utah 6 3, 15 7 P 2d 2 58 ------------------- 7

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

STATE OF UTAH,

Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 883

BUDD JAY READ,
Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Budd Jay Read, the defendant and appellant herein, was
convicted of the crime of involuntary manslaughter arising
out of an automobile-bicycle collision in Logan, Cache County,
Utah, on September 6, 1951, and appeals.
Appellant's brief summarizes fairly accurately the evtdence which was presented to the Court and jury upon which
the conviction was based. Respondent will therefore refrain
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from making an independent presentation of the facts at this
time but will do so where necessary in view of the fact that
appellant asserts that the evidence does not support the conviction.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN

THE CONVICTION.
2. THE COURT

PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE

JURY.
3. THE COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GRANT A
NEW TRIAL.

ARGUMENT
Point I.

THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE
CONVICTION.
Points 1, 6 and 8 relied upon by appellant for a reversal
all relate to the proposition that there was r{ot sufficient evi_dence to submit the case to the jury or to sustain the. conviction.
It is respectfully submitted that an analysis of the record will
show that there was ample evidence of the criminal negligence
of the defendant which directly caused or contributed to the
death of the deceased.
4
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The evidence reveals that the accident occurred at ap·
proximately 5:00 P.M. on September 6, 1951, as defendant
\vas proceeding north on the east side of Main Street between·
5th and 6th North Streets in Logan, Utah. Defendant's own
testimony establishes that just prior to the impact he was not
keeping a proper look-out but "that his entire attention was
directed to a car coming out of Safeway's parking lot on
the east side of the street (Tr. 191). He freely admitted
he paid no attention to traffic conditions on the street (Tr.
203·4) . There is no evidence in the record to show. that the
view of defendant was in any way impaired (Tr. 204). All
of the evidence indicates that a reasonably prudent person
under the same or similar circumstances would have observed
the deceased and would have avoided hitting him. In addition to the fact that defendanfs attention was directed away
from the direction in which he was proceeding, there is substantial evidence to show that defendant was intoxicated and
that his ability to keep his 'Car under proper control was impaired (Tr. 79, 99, 125, 194). It is undisputed that the
posted speed limit at the time and place in question was 25
n1iles an hour, and it is respectfully submitted that the evidence shows defendant drove his car in excess of the posted.
speed litnit, and with marked disregard for the safety of others
(Tr. 59, 149).
Eye witness testimony establishes that the death of the
deceased was almost instantaneous and a direct and proximate
result of the impact. The direct examination of Mrs. Bjorkman
(Tr. 46) includes the following:
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Q. Then what happened then? What did you observe
with respect to the impact itself?
A. Well, when the car hit the bicycle the man flew
up in the air, and as he came down the car hit him
once more, and then the body kept rolling over
and landed in front of my car.

Q. How far west did the body stop with respect to your
car?
A. Just a little in front of my car.
Mrs. Bjorkman observed also that ((blood was pouring out
of his head" and that ((there was a big pool of blood" (Tr. 47).
The testimony shows further that as a result of the ((terrific
impact" (Tr. 45) the body was violently hurled a dist ance of
61 feet (Tr. 30).
· The contradicted tesimony reveals that the doctor was
· present at the scene within two minutes after the impact. Upon
making appropriate observations he stated that there was no
need to examine the body because the man was already dead
(Tr. 77, 85). No other conclusion but that the terrific impact
and the projection of deceased's body against the hard surface
of the highway caused his death would be tenable. The jury,
with whom rested the sole responsibility for resolving the evidence which was presented for their consideration properly
came to that conclusion under appropriate instructions from
the court that they must find beyond a reasonable doubt that
the criminal negligence of the defendant was ((the proximate
cause of the accident and resulting death."
From the foregoing facts, the argument that there should
have been a directed verdict of not guilty, that appellant's
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motion for arrest of judgment should have been sustained,
or that defendant's request not to submit the cause to the jury
at all should have been sustained, is contrary to the ruling of
this Court in the case of State v. Thatcher, 108 Utah 63, 157
P. 2d 258. That case dealt with a charge of involuntary manslaughter arising out of an automobile accident. This Court,
in holding that under the circumstances the trial court erred
in granting defendant's motion of dismissal, said:
It is a well established legal principle that a motion
of dismissal and for direction of verdict for defendant
is, in effect, a demurrer to the evidence. It admits the
truth of the evidence as disclosed by the record and
every reasonable inference that might be drawn therefrom. When different reasonable inferences can be
drawn from the evidence, the question is one exclusively within the province of the jury. It is not the function of the court to substitute its judgment on questions_
of fact for that of the jury. Therefore, in considering
the question of the sufficiency of the evidence, the
record must be viewed in the light almost favorable
to the state. Stat v. Rosser, 162 Or. 293, 86 P 2d 441,.
87 p 2d 783, 91 p 2d 295.

* * * * *

Although the evidence may not have been sufficient
to have proven that defendant was traveling as fast
as 60 miles· -per hour as testified to by the patrolmen, ·
nevertheless, after a careful examination of the record,
we conclude, that the jury could have found from.
their testimony that defendant was exceeding the speed
limit and that said speeding was a proximate cause
of the accident.

* * * * *

We conclude that defendant's failure to keep his
eyes and attention on the road in front of him while
7
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driving at a high rate of speed· at nighttime. was sufficient evidence to have justified the jury in finding that
his driving was in marked disregard for the safety
of the deceased or criminal negligence. The trial court
. erred in granting defendant's motion of dismissal.
In the same case, in a separate concurring opinion, Justice
Wolfe remarked:
The fact that defendant hit the pedestrians, if not
explained, would itself justify an inference that he
was not keeping a proper lookout.
In Albert v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 894, 27 SE 2d 177,
another case involving an appeal from a conviction of involuntary manslaughter as a result of an automobile accident, the
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia said:
It may in passing, however, be said if Albert was
drunk and if his .drunkenness brought about_ Mrs.
Johnson's death, he is still liable even though he was
as careful as a drunk man could be expected to be.
The California Court in People v. Kelley, 70 Cal. App.
519, 234 P 1~0, had this to say about the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the verdict of the jury in finding the
defendant guilty of manslaughter in an automobile accident
case.
As to the verdict against the defendant finding him
guilty of manslaughter, appellant contends that the
evidence· is insufficient to support such a verdict. In
supportof this contention appellant claims that there
was no proof introduced by the prosecution, asid~ from
his own extra judicial admissions, as to the rate of
speed appellant was traveling at the time of and just
8
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prior to the collision. Conceding for the present that
the only evidence as to the speed appellant was traveling was that furnished by his own extrajudicial admissions, yet there was evidence tending to prove that
appellant, at and just prior to the collision, was driving
his car while under the influence of liquor, and that,
while so driving his car, he collided with Mrs. Sarah
Joy, and from such collision she sustained injuries
which caused her death. This evidence was sufficient
to support the verdict of manslaughter independent
of any evidence as to the speed at which appellant was
driving has car at the time he struck the deceased.
In Keller v. State, 155 Tenn. 633, 299 S.W. 803, 59 A.L.R.
685, it appeared that a person was undertaking to cross a street
in the middle of a block when he was run over and killed by
the accused, who was under the influence of an intoxicant
at the time. The court, in affirming a conviction of involuntary"
manslaughter said:

* * * We

think the policy of the law forbids an
investigation as to probable ·consequence, when the
. driver of an automobile cunder the influence of an intoxicant,' as heretofore defined, runs his car E:?Ver another person and kills him on the public highways of
the state. There are many things that a sober man, in
the exercise of due care, would do to avoid such a colliison, which would be entirely beyond an intoxicated
driver. Fa tali ties are too numerous and conditions too
serious to permit speculative inquiries in a case like
the one before us.
According to the well settled rules of law it is peculiarly
within the province of the jury to deter~ine from all the facts
and circumstances surrounding the transaction whether there
was such a failure of duty or negligence as to render one
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criminally responsible for the death of another. 26 Am. Jur.,
Homicide, Sees. 507, 508. Where there is such evidence appellate courts are loathe to overturn the verdict of the injury.
See State v. Johnson, ____ Mo. ____ , 55 SW 2d 967; Pack v. State,
54 Ok. Cr. 234, 18 P 2d 284; Cain v. State, ____ Tex. Cr. R ----,
178 SW 2d 267; Flowers v. State, ____ Tex. Cr. ____ 177, SW 2d 67.

Point II.
THE COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY.
By requested instruction No. Four the defendant wanted
the court to point out to the jury that even if they should believe that the de~endant was operating _his car while under
the influence of liquor, their verdict should be not guilty if
he was then exercising due and proper caution and was therefore not guilty of grossly negligent, wanton or reckless acts
proximately causing injury to the deceased and his death. That
is exactly what the court did when in Instruction No. Eight it
defined the phrase ((under the influence of intoxicating liquor''
and in instruction No. Six it pointed out specifically that ((if,
however, you believe that the defendant was then exercising
due and proper care and caution, and was not guilty of criminal
negligence proximately causing injury to the deceased and
his death, your verdict should be not guilty.',
Instruction No. Nine given by the court embodies all
the assumptions set forth in defendant's requestion Instruction
No. Ten on which assumptions defendant claims he had a
right to rely. we submit that the instruction as given is in
10
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language even n1ore favorable to the defendant than his requested instruction. Likewise defendant's requested Instruction No. One and one-half we submit was given to the jury
in the court's instructions Nos. Two and Three.
It is a well recognized rule that instructions need not
be given in the precise 'vords in which counsel frames them.
ttl£ the court instructs the jury correctly and in substance
covers the relevant rules of law proposed to him by counsel,
there is no error in refusing to adopt the exact words of requests." 53 Am. Jur., Trial, Sec. 529.
The argument of appellant in Point No. 5 is not well
taken. Instruction No. Ten given by the court merely
states a fundamental principal of law that if defendant were
not negligent he should be acquitted. When read in the light
of the other instructions requiring the jury to find that the
criminal negligence of the defendant, if any, must_ be the proxi- ·
mate cause of the accident and resulting death, it could not have
prejudiced the defendant in any way.
In Points 9 and 10 appellant argues that the Court erred
in_ admitting in evidence Exhibit A," showing skid marks,_
or any testimony at ·au concerning skid marks, because it is
claimed that there was no evidence that the skid marks were
made by defendant's car. Further, appellant objects to Mr.
Hadfield's computations of speed from the skid marks referred to because of appellant's claim that he purportedly was
not qualified to do so.
tl

The authorities all support the proposition that witnesses
present at the scene of an accident at the time or shortly after
11·
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its occurrence may testify that marks leading to where an
automobile was located· were or could have been made by such
automobile. See Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law
and Practice, Permanent Edition, Sec. 6320; Alabama Power
Co. v. Jackson, 232 Ala. 42, 166 So. 692; Silsby v. Hinchey,
107 SW 2d 812; and, Alaga Co~ch Line v. McCarrol, 227 Ala.,
686, 151 So. 834, 92 A.L.R. 470. In this case there were several witnesses "rho saw the skid marks and testified that they
\vere. or could have been made by defendant's car.
Mr. Tolman's testimony is .explicit that they . did come
from defendant's car. He testified in part as follows (Tr. 16,
17):
Q. Is there any indication at all that those skid marks
which you speak about, was there anything on the
pavement there that tends to show that they came
from this young man's car?

A. Yes, sir.
Q. What are they?

A. From the skid marks straight to where the bicycle
was you could see dictinctly two tire marks the
distanceQ. Just a minute.

THE COURT: Let him answer now.
him.

You asked

MR. NELSON: He's your witness now. Let him go
ahead.
Q. Will you state it again now?

A. You could see skid marks the distance between.
an automobile's tires, so that you could pretty well
tell it was the same car, because they went in the
12
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same line the same distance apart straight to where
the bicycle was, and that's where they ended, and
that's \vhere some more glass was found.
See also the testimony of Mrs. Bjorkman (Tr. 48, 49, 61, 62,
65), Mr. Merrill (Tr. 71) and.Mr. Everton (Tr. 85, 86).
It is respectfully submitted that the testimony of Mr.
Hadfield was not prejudicial to the defendant. His computations were made by applying a formula he learned at the
Traffic School at Northwestern University, Evansville, Illinois,
to hypothetical situations which were presented to him. He
did not ascribe any particular speed to defendant's car but
merely stated what speed was indicated from hypothetical facts
submitted to him. It rested exclusively with the jury in considering all the other evidence as to the speed of defendant's
car to determine what weight and credibility, if any, should
be accorded Mr. Hadfield's testimony.
The alleged errors set forth by appellant in Point -No. 11
we submit have been adequately answered in our argument
under Point No. I. As to the questionnaire form of instruction number two, it is well established that the language, form
and style of instructions in which the court expounds the law
are matters within the sound discretion of the court. 53 Am.
Jur., Trial, Sec. 5 39, 541.

POINT III
THE COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GRANT A
NEW TRIAL.
The alleged errors set forth in Point No. 12 raise no issues
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which have not already been covered and it is respectfully submitted that there is substantial evidence in the record to
establish beyond a reasonabel doubt that the defendant was
guilty of criminal negligence which directly caused or contributed to the death of the deceased.

CONCLUSION
Respondent respectfully submits that a review of the
transcript and proceedings· in this case discloses ample and
sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction of defendant of
the crime of involuntary manslaughter. The crime was established by proper and uncontroverted testimony. It is submitted
the instructions given by the Court fairly and completely covered the law pertinent to the issues raised in this case; indeed
said instructions weer favorable to the defendant. The conviction should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
CLINTON D. VERNON,

Attorney General
QUENTIN L. R. ALSTON,
RICHARD

J.

MAUGHAN,

Assistant Attorneys General
Attot"neys for Respondent
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